Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-1-1956

Oakland v. Burns [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Oakland v. Burns [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 150.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/150

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

CITY OJC OAKLAND

v.

BURNS

401

[46 C.2d 401; 296 P.2d 3331
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1,

OF OAKLAND, Appel1ant, v. FltANK A. BURNS
et al., Defendants; HERMAN STELZNEH et al., Respondents.
Municipal Corporations - Governmental and Proprietary
Powers.-A
has all power over that
of a
road which is located on airport property
the city in
its proprietary capacity.
Dedication-Who :May Dedicate.-A city board of port commissioners lacks power to dedicate to a public usc by
tion any portion of a private road located on airport property
held by the city in its proprietary capacity.
Id.-By :Municipality.-Unless specifically restricted, a municicorporation may make an actual dedication of land owned
it just as a private owner may, and the manner in which
such offer can be made will be the same in both cases except
insofar as the mode to be used by a municipal corporation is
restricted by law, constitution or charter.
Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Right of Property
-Limitations.-The Legislature may prescribe the method by
which the power to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of municipal property shall be exercised and, if applicable, the method
so provided must be substantially followed.
Streets-Establishment-Dedication.-The mode of dedicating
municipal property as a public street, as pre~cribed by a municipal charter, is the measure of the power to dedicate, and a
dedication made in disregard of such mode is unenforceable.
!d.-Establishment, Alteration and Improvement.-Under a
city charter provision declaring that "whenever" the city
board of port commissioners "shall" determine that it is
necessary to open, close, improve, alter or vacate a public
street within the port area a certified copy of the resolution
determining such necessity "shall" be filed by the board in
the city clerk's office, whereupon the city manager and city
council "shall" initiate the necessary proceedings, the word
"whenever" indicates that the mode prescribed is exclusive,
See Cal.Jur.2d, Dedication, § 16 et seq.; Am.Jur., Dedication,
MeK. Dig. References: [1, 9, 10] Munieipal Corporations, § 97;
Dedieation, § ii; [3] Dedieation, §[it!; [ 4] Constitutional Law,
; [G] Streets, § 14; [6] Streets,§§ 13, 18, 2G; [7, 8] Adver:w
ucoco•co0•va, § 11; [11] Public Utilities, § 26.
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use of the word "shall" shows that such
Adverse Possession-Property Held for Public Use.-No title
can be
subdivision
as a

[9] Municipal Corporations - Governmental and Proprietary
Powers.-vVhen
entity is authorized to exercise
proprietary, the law leans to the theory that
a power
it has full power to perform it in the same efficient manner
as a
person would.
[10] !d.-Governmental and Proprietary Functions.-Recognition
of the
that a municipality acting in a proprietary
capacity must be allowed the powers necessary to perform it
efficiently and be free from restrictions which impede its
efficiency does not require that it must also be free from
restricting provisions which do not impede its specific function, such as one restricting the manner in which the municipality may open public streets over its lands, or preclude it
from relying on rules advantageous to it, such as the one
protecting it against the acquisition of prescriptive rights by
third parties.
[11] Public Utilities-Regulation-Scope of Jurisdiction of Commission.-N o constitutional or code provision gives the Public
Utilities Commission any power of regulation over private
roads.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Donald K. Quayle, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages and for an injunction to restrain the
operation of limousine or bus service from and on a municipal airport. Judgment for certain defendants reversed with
directions.
J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney, and Edward A. Goggin,
Assistant Port Attorney, for Appellant.
Rodney H. Hamblin, Joseph M. Hamblin, Donovan, Stuhr
& Martin and Herbert Bartholomew for Respondents.
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession, § 10; Am.Jur., Adverse
Possession, § 104 et seq.
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J .-Plaintiff
of zlZ'femlants Stelzner and
to restrain the

of certain ordinances
Board of Port Commissioners
and of the exelusiYe licc·nse and concession
tbr board for said servicrs at the airport to li'ialer's LimouI nc. (hereinafter called li'ialer
l'laintitf owns the airport and operates it through the
in its proprietary capacity. Earhart Road is the prinroadway within the airport passing the main buildings,
vYhi~h are the Intemational 'l'erminal Building, hangars
installations. Earhart Hoad has been paved and pro\vith curbings by the board. Since 1927 the main part
road has been nsed generally by the public with the
and without objection from the board, vvhich at no
took any action to terminate such general use.
Barhart Hoad has not been dedicated to the public use in
formal mannet. An unnamed side road of Earhart Road
the southwesterly side of the International 'rerminal
and a parking and turni11g area in back of said
has been used since 1947 for
transportation
for passengers of nonscheduled airlines, and Yehicles
these passengers for hire had access to thifl
only by revocable permits of the board and its agents.
area has not been dedicated to public use either formally
implication.
agreement was entered into between plaintiff in its
and Fialer
the latter an
('xdusiYe license for certain transportation services for hire
November 1, 1951. 'rhis agreement the trial
found valid except insofar as it purported to accord
's exclusive rights with respect to the part of Earhart
found to be a public street.
following ordinances allegedly violated by defendants
found to be valid ordinances regulating the use of airport
"'"""''T" held by plaintiff in its proprietary capacity but not
to the public part of Earhart Road:
Port Ordinance Number 641, which, among other
prohibits the use of the airport as a base for the
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other commercial
its
manager;
Ordinance Number 786 prohibits solicitation of
for any
limousine or airline bus service
within the airport or entering the airport for ;;uch purpose
when authorized by contract;
Port Ordinance Number 835, which added to Port Ordinance Number 812, section 2.1 prohibiting the operation of
any vehicle or bus from the airport unless with the approval
of the board and on its conditions and terms;
Section 106 of Council Ordinance Number 3083 C.M.S.,
which prohibited the operation or leaving of a vehicle on private property without express permission of the owner.
Since November 1, 1951, Fialer's, under agreement with
plaintiff, had been the only one entitled to solicit patronage
for or to engage in the transportation of persons on or from
the airport in airline motor buses, taxicabs or limousines
except that defendants might operate on the portion of Earhart Road found by the trial court to be a public street.
Defendant Stelzner provided transportation with one limousine from March 21, 1946, to January 8, 1953. Defendant
McCoy provided transportation with one bus from 1947 to
January 1953.
Prior to November 1, 1951, defendants used the parking
area in back of the International Terminal Building in operating their vehicles. On that date their permits were revoked
and thereafter they used only the portion of Earhart Road
which the trial court found to be a public street.
Both defendants were duly licensed by the city to operate
a limousine carrying passengers for hire on the public streets
of the city. On January 23, 1951, defendant McCoy was
granted by the Public Utilities Commission a certificate of
public convenience and necessity authorizing him to operate
a passenger stage service for transportation of nonscheduled
airline passengers from the airport to certain points in Oakland, San Francisco and Treasure Island over the most
appropriate streets between the points authorized. Defendant
McCoy is under a duty to provide ground transportation
service in accordance with the certificate obtained.
Within a year prior to the commencement of the action
defendants had not committed any of the acts prohibited in
the above-mentioned ordinances except on the portion of
Earhart Road which the trial court determined to be a
public street.
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Plaintiff contends that no part of Barllart Hoad is
street but that in its entirety it is a
road
the airport. 'rhis contention is correct. Plaintiff has
power oyer Earhart Road so far as the same is lo<'ated
airport property held by plaintiff in its proprietary
[2] Plaintiff is right in its contention that the
Board of Port Commissioners lacked powrr to (1ediimp1ieatiou any portion of Earhart Hoa(l to a public
Rinee the board lacked power to f1e(lieate l~arhart Road to a
u:se in the manner found by the trial
to
ieation, it i:s unnecessary to <'onsider lwrf~ wheiher an
<lP<lieation eonl<1 be founded in HllY ('HSP npon eviden('<~
nothing more tban a permis:sive use of a rn<Hl by tlw
for access purposes, which the trial eourt fonn(l "<lead" within the premises of the O\Vllt'r.
It is the general rnle that a municipal corporation,
RIJPcifically restricted, may as well make an aetual
off0r of rledication of land owned by it as a priYate owner
(
CaLTur. (1925) § 384, p. 23; cf. City of Oakland v.
Oakland Water Pront Co., 162 Cal. 675, 680 [124 P. 251])
and he manner in which sncb offer can be made will be the
same in both cases (16 Am .•Tur. (1938) § 13, p. 356) except
insofar as for a municipal corporation, the mode is restricted
eom;titution or charter.
It is likewise the rule that the l~egislatnre may prescribe the method by which t11e power to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of property shall be exercised and, if applicable,
the method so provided must be substantially followed. ( Cf.
of San Diego v. California Water etc. Co., 30 Cal.2d
817 at 823 [2] [186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747]; JJJiller v.
20 Ca1.2d 83 at 88 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R 570],
wlwre Mr. ,Justice Carter, in quoting from Los Angeles DredgY. C1:ty of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 353 [291 P. 839,
JJ.H. 161], said : "It is . . . settled that the mode of
as prescribed by the municipal charter, is the
m<'asnre of the pO\ver to contract; and a contract made in
of tlw prescribed mode is mwHforceable. ")
[5] The sanw prin<'.iple applies to yohmt a1·y <lf'di<·at ion of
property to be a p11 hl ie street.
In t!H~ instant ca:-:t~, Hll <'X<~lnsiv<; lllodn or Op('lling·
streets in the port area is prescribed m section 218
Oakland City Charter, which reads:
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''Sec. 218. Whenever the Board shall determine that it is
necessary to open, close, improve, alter or vacate a public
or part of a public street within the 'Port Area,' a
certified copy of the resolution so determining such necessity
the Board in the office of the City Clerk,
shall be filed
the
and the
Council
initiate and carry to
the
necessary to
''
effect said
The word ''"Whenever ' indicates that the mode
while the repeated use of the word ''shall'' in
the
shows that such method is manSection 217 of plaintiff's charter prevents it or the council
from performing any of the acts mentioned in section 218
without the cooperation of the Board of Port Commissioners.
It is undisputed that Earhart Road has not been opened
as a public street in the manner prescribed by section 218,
supm. If the board had the intention and made the
implied offer to dedicate Earhart Road as a public street
without substantially following the procedure outlined in
section 218 of the charter, such offer would have been invalid and ineffective. [7] Should it be argued that the
creation of an easement of a public street by adverse user
by the public as mentioned above without an actual intent
or offer to dedicate by plaintiff or any of its agents is not
the opening of a public street by the board or plaintiff but
an adverse imposing of such burden to which section 218 does
not apply, the answer is that such rights would be by prescription and that no title by prescription can be acquired
against any municipal corporation or subdivision of the state
in land reserved for or devoted to some specific public use.
(Civ. Code, § 1007*; Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v.
State, 18 Cal.2d 169 at 172 [2] [114 P.2d 331]; Bartholomew v.
Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d 844, 857 [195 P.2d 824] [hearing
denied by the Supreme Court] ; Reclamation Dist. No. 833 v.
American Farms Co., 209 Cal. 74 at 81 [6] [285 P. 688].)
*Section 1007 of the Civil Code reads in part as follows: '' . . . but
no possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long
continued of any land, water, water right, easement, or other property
whatsoever dedicated to or owned by any county, city and county, city,
irrigation district, public or municipal corporation or any department or
agency thereof, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against
such county, city and county, city, public or municipal corporation,
irrigation district, or any department or agency thereof or any agency
created or authorized by the Constitution or any law of this State for the
administration of any State school, college or university.''

407
here involved
excludes the
of
by
the fact that section 1238
lists airports
of eminent
uv•'"U'"~ may be exercised.
is likewise no merit in the contention of defendants
cannot
on the
rules of public
their right to use Earhart Road as a public
because the municipality defends its right to make the
contract with Fialer 's on the ground that it operin a proprietary and not in a governmental
city claims the right to make an exclusive transportacontraet at the airport because it appears reasonable that
the power to acquire and operate a proprietary function
all necessary power to operate it efficiently.
vVhen a governmental entity is authorized to exercise a
purely proprietary, the law leans to the theory that
full power to perform it in the same efficient manner
private person would. (Ex parte Hmtston, 93 Okla.
26 [224 P.2d 281 at 292 [4-7]] ; Miami Beach Airline
Service v. Crandon, 159 Fla. 504 [32 So.2d 153, 155, 172
A.L.R. 1425] .) In the latter case this principle was used
an exclusive contract of the same kind as that of
However, it does not follow from the recognition of
principle that a municipality acting in a proprietary
must be allowed the powers necessary to perform it
and to be free from restrictions which impede its
vWvH.'H•,r that it must also be free from restricting provisions
do not impede its specific function, like the one
the manner in which plaintiff may open public
over its lands, or that it cannot rely on rules advanto it such as the one protecting it against the
of prescriptive rights by third parties.
Section 218 of the Oakland Municipal Charter does not
any restrictions indicating that it does not apply to
of streets over lands devoted to a public use of
character, and the rule excluding acquisition of
rights against municipalities is likewise applicable.
the certificate of public convenience and necessity
of defendant McCoy orders him to conduct his operations
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publie streets and
authorized.'' Dt:feodant McCo~·
.Juri;.;didioll of the Public Utilities Commis.
sion over thl' hu~ aud limou~ine services on Barhart Hoad
art.
§ 2:!; Pub. Util. Code, § 1003) on the
(CaL
basis
that Earhart Road is a public street.
'l'lw certificate docs not eontain any finding that Earhart
Hoad
a public street or any decision that the authorized
Ncn·ice "from the Municipal Airport" must take place over
Earhart Hoad. [11] Defendants do not contend that the
Public Utilities Commission has any power of regulation over
private roads and no constitutional or code provision gives
it such power. ( Cf. Kuhn v. ]i'err·y & Hensler, 91 Cal.App.2d
805 [206 P .2d 1 J [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)
People v. County of 1Uarin, 103 Cal. 223, 230 [37 P. 203, 26
hiLA. 659], is not here in point. In the eited case the
county of Marin had accepted an offer to dedicate, and the
court held that the acceptance was valid even though the
statutory procedure was not followed. (People v. County of
Marin, supra, p. 229.) However, in the instant case, our
decision does not limit the power of the public or the legislative body to accept an offer to dedicate. It merely holds that
in dedicating public property there must be substantial compliance with constitutional, statutory and charter provisions.
'rhe decision in People v. County of Marin is not overruled.
'rhe judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law and to
enter a judgment in accordance with the views expressed
herein.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J ., Traynor, .J., Sehauer, J., and
Spence, .J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
'l'he majority opinion in this case fails to give effect to the
rule applicable to common law dedication of public thoroughfares in spite of the numerous authorities announcing it which
are controlling here.
IJet us look at the facts with regard to Earhart Road as
found by the trial court (there is no question of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support those findings). The court found:
'' 'rhe Oakland Municipal Airport was first established in the
year 1927 upon approximately eight hundred (800) acres
of land then constituting a part of the 'Port Area' of the
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of
Earhart
and are all within said
Since the establishment
the
roa.dway
of

servand installations
aircraft
and other servie(~S
Said road was extended
from time
awl
dead-ended within said airport proprrty.
year 1835 :said road was
'J~arhaet Road' by
the Bom·d of Por·t Commissioner-s. In the year
, the Board of Port Commissioners by ordinance dedicated
use as a public street or highway a road now known
Doolittle Drive which was laid out as a state highway
runs generally parallel with Earhart Hoad in a northdirection from said Hegenberger Road along and
of the northeasterly boundary of said airport, and
City of Alameda. Thereafter aecess roads were established between Earhart Road at and near its northwesterly
and said Doolittle Drive. Said connecting roads were
at or about the time Doolittle Drive was laid out and
as a public street. Said Earhart Road is the
road serving sa1"d airport and the bttilclings and
businesses lowtcd thereon. The International Terminal Build(used as a passenger station for non-scheduled airline
fronts on the southwesterly side of Earhart Road
situated approximately seven hundred eighty (780)
feet sonthvvesterly along Earhart Road from its commencement at Ilegrnberger Road . . . .
"Said Earhart Road . . . [was] paved and said Earhart
Howl ,,·idened by Raid Board of Port Commissioners and wert~
at all times maintained by said Board. Said Board eaused
to be ereete<l along the edges of said roadways and
delineated said
on maps and ehartR of the Oakland
Airport
on file in the office of ihe Chief
of tht• Hoartl of Port Commissioners . . . . Since
Earl1art Road hereinafter spccifi1.9:37 tll c
usecl gcnrrally by the public with
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the
of and without objection
the Board
Port Commissioners which at no time took any action to terminate such general use." (Emphasis added.) Thus everything which is ever necessary to common law
has occurred. It -vvould be difficult to conceive
a more
plain case for the application of the
implied
common law
the majority
while
concludes that it
acknowledging the rule of such
did not occur because
was not had with
217 and 218 of the Oakland Charter. Those sections provide
nothing more than that dedication for roads may be initiated
by resolution of the Board of Port Commissioners and completed by the city council. Section 217 reads: "No franchise shall be granted, no property shall be acquired or sold,
no street shall be opened, altered, closed or abandoned, and
no sewer, street, or other public improvement shall be located
or constructed in the 'Port Area' by the City of Oakland,
or the Council thereof, without the approval of the Board.''
Section 218 reads: "Whenever the Board shall determine
that it is necessary to open, close, improve, alter or vacate a
public street, or part of a public street within the 'Port Area,'
a certified copy of the resolution so determining such necessity
shall be filed by the Board in the office of the City Clerk,
whereupon the City Manager and the City Council shall
initiate and carry to completion the proceedings necessary
to effect said proposal." (Oakland City Charter, §§ 217.
218.)
First, looking at the law on implied dedication we find the
following: A municipal corporation may make a common
law dedication of its property for a street the same as privatr
owners. It is said: ''A municipality may itself dedicate
property, unless specially restricted, as may the state. Likewise towns, and school authorities, have been held to have
this power." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.),
§ 33.14.) (See 16 Am.Jur., Dedication, § 13; County of Yo~o
v. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 [21 P. 833, 12 Am.St.Rep. 152].) Here
there has been more than a mere offer to dedicate contrary
to the intimation of the majority opinion. The dedication
is an accomplished fact by reason of the various things found
by the trial court. Nor is the part of the rule that a municipality may dedicate its property unless restricted by law,
applicable, because the land is of a character which may be
dedicated and section 218 is not such a restriction. It only
provides one way in which a dedication may be made.
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argues,
that section 218 is the
which there may be a dedication
the city.
section
says that the Board of Port Commissioners
determine by resolution when it is necessary to "open"
and the
council proceeds from there on. There
reasons why that section does not prevent the
common law dedication. It does not purport to
such dedication and at most is
one method
it may be accomplished. It cannot be said to be a
on the power of a city to dedicate its property, as
the majority opinion, for the rule that a statute
measure of the power of a local governmental agency
apply to chartered cities. "[B] y accepting the priviautonomous rule the city has all powers over municipal
otherwise lawfully exercised, subject only to the clear
limitations and restrictions contained in the charThe charter operates not as a grant of power, but as an
instrument of limitation and restriction on the exercise of
power over all municipal affairs which the city is assumed to
possess; and the enumeration of powers does not constitute an
or limitation. (West Coast Advertising Co. v. San
14 Cal.2d 516, 521-522, 525 [95 P.2d 138] and
cited . . . . As recognized in the \Vest Coast Advertising
the levy of taxes for city purposes is a municipal affair;
treatment and disposal of city sewage and
of contracts therefor are likewise municipal
(Loop Lumber Co. v. Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228,
P. 600] ) , and neither rnay be held to be circumscribed except as expressly limited by the charter provisions.
An ndes of statutory construction as applied to charter
. . . are subordinate to this controlling principle.
The former guide-that municipalities have only the powers
eonferred and those necessarily incident thereto. . . . A construction in favor of the exercise of the power and against
the existence of any limitation or restriction thereon which
is Hot expressly stated in the charter is clearly indicated. So
reason dictates that the full exercise of the power is
nf'rm,,tte>rl except as clearly and explicitly curtailed.
Thus in
the city's charter a restriction on the exercise of
power may not be implied.'' (Emphasis added;
Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 598-599
P.2d 894].) Thus in the instant case sections 217 and
218 do not clearly or explicitly prohibit the city from making

'l'he board must approve
Pstabl
'l'hc board may express
resolution but tllat is
the formal way of
it it does not cxelude the informal method embodied in common law dedication which may occur when the
conduct on the
of the
occurs as is found
such de<lication may result when the formal profor dedication are defective. As said in People v.
103 Cal. 223, 229 [37 P. 203, 26 L.R.A.
'' 'fhat the general public used the road as a public
is established by the evidence beyond reasonable
<loubt. It is sai<l that all of this testimony fails to establish
a statutory dedication of the highway. This may be conceded, but 'in many instances a dedication invalid as a statutm·y one will be a good corrmwn-law dedication.' (Elliott on
Hoads and Streets, 85, 86.)" (Emphasis added.) And it is
said: ''An incomplete or defective statutory dedication or
an ineffectual attempt to make a statutory dedication will,
when accepted by the pnblic or when rights are acquired under
it by third persons, operate as a common-law dedication."
(16 Am.Jur., Dedication, §52.) This is further established
by the many cases that hold that although an acceptance
of the street by the municipality or other government agency
is necessary to complete a dedication, yet this may be shown
by conduct by the ageney sueh as was found in this case even
though the statutory procedure for acceptance was not followed. (People v. County of Marin, supra, 103 Cal. 223;
1licGinn v. State Board of Harbor Comrs., 113 Cal.App. 695,
703-704 [299 P. 100] ; Fitzgerald v. Smith, 94 Cal.App. 480
[271 P. 507]; County of Sacramento v. La~tszus, 70 Cal.App.
2d 639 [161 P.2d 460]; Richardson v. O'IIanrahan, 83 Cal.
App. 415 [256 P. 1103] ; San ]i'rancisco S~llplwr Co. v. County
of Contra Costa, 207 Cal. 1, 6 [276 P. 570]; St. John v. King,
1:30 Cal.App. 356 [20 P.2d 123] .) It is said in the Marin
County case, s~tpra, where the county board of supervisors
declared a road to be a public one: "[A]lthough the proceeding was not accompanied by all the for·ms req1tired by the

statute to constitute it a highway in a statutory sense, still
it was evidence of an acceptance by the board for the public
as such highway; which evidence, coupled with its uses for
a highway, and its improvement as such by public authority,
is ample to support an acceptance." (Emphasis added;
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next pass to the eontention tlHit
not in fact

to
of
of
as
s1n,c1
'l'he eontrntion of
to
the subdivisions dPf'eribed in Hw
the recorded
such subdivisions whieh named streets and thoroughnot aeceptcd by the board of supervisors, but, on
tlw eontrary, acceptance had been denied, and that as to
thereof accepted, the aceeptanee though granted was
not indorsed upon the maps. lt is plain that the making
anr1 rceorclation of these maps was an offer of dedication to
the
of these spaces as thoroughfares and public streets.
It is also dear from the complaint that no withdrawal of
oJf:er of dedication has ever been made. The mere
of the work 'done' and the completion thereof by

the board of supervisors ?·s, thet·cfore, an implied acceptance
of the
dedicat?:on. Neither
could thereafter suecontend that the thoroughfares ·were anything other
public strrets. \Vhile it is trne that the
profor express dedication tDerc not literally complied
ample appears to show that an implied acceptance of
offt'r \\'11S made
the board.
v. Coun
86 Cal. 405 [24 P. 1094]; People v.
of
103 CaL 223, 227 [26 IdLA. 65fJ, 37 P. 203]; Davidow
2:1 Cal.App. 188 11:37 P. 619] .) "
(Emphasis
addr-d.) In eonnection with the cases above quoted from, it
be not('([ that aeconling to the findings hrrc the board
a rrsolution giving Barlwrt Hoad its llalllf'. Ccriai1Jly
:mbstantial i:onrplianec \l'illt se(:tions 217 <llHl 2JR of
i·harter or at lt-a;-;t snffici<'nt to show a eomnJull law otf('l'
;We<' o!' a dr::1it•a1io1l l!llli••l' thi~ rnlP ~La1<·d in iJI(c
Couuty and San Franeisc:o eases. \Vhile words of
such as that the street is hereby cstablishr<t were not
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the resolution shows
board of Earhart as a public road.
To reach the conclusion arrived at
the
above cited cases must be overruled. They cannot be distinguished.
The rule for which the
stands may have more
serious effects than are
all the
done by the city here are done on a
of land owned by
the
and in reliance thereon millions of dollars of improvements are erected fronting on it. It would seem inconceivable that this court would hold there was no dedication,
would permit the city to erect barriers across the street and
stop the flow of traffic thereon rendering valueless the investments in the improvements.
I would affirm the judgment.

[S. F. No. 19386.

In Bank.

May 1, 1956.)

BARBARA I-1EE SPRAGUE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-New and
Further Disability.-The Industrial Accident Commission correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain
a petition for increased disability rating filed more than five
years after the date of injury, though the injured employee
filed a prior petition for further medical treatment within the
five-year period, where it was not suggested on the hearing of
that petition that she was seeking an increased permanent
disability rating because of any new and further disability,
where notwithstanding a recital in such petition that she had
"suffered from increased disability and pain" it was stipulated
that the "only question" raised was the "need for further
medical treatment," and where she did not thereafter claim,
by petition for reconsideration or for judicial review, that any
issue that had been raised had been left undetermined.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission dismissing petition for increased disability
rating. Order affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 134; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 409.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 141.

